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The realist movement in American legal thought 1 may be said to have
reached its flower within the past five years. There were, to be sure, premonitions of it as early as the beginning of the present century. The realist
himself likes to consider his movement as taking its origin in an address
delivered by Justice Holmes in 1897.2 As early as 1912 there existed a systematic formulation of the realist view, however little it may have been
noticed. 3 These beginnings should suffice to confer at least a semblance of
historical respectability on the realist movement. It is not a mere upstart
without roots in the past. Yet it is only recently that the realist view has
begun to fire the imaginations of legal scholars, that it has provoked men
t A. B. 1924, J.D. 1926, Stanford University; Professor of Law, Duke University;
author of Legal Fictions (1931) 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513, 877, and of notes and book reviews
in various legal journals.
'A good bibliography of American legal realism may be found in Llewellyn, Some
Realism about Realism (193i) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1257-1259. It should, perhaps, be
pointed out that American legal realism has no traceable connection with the neo-realist
movement in American philosophy. On the contrary the adherents of legal realism have for
the most part inclined to an epistemology which may be called idealistic in the modem acceptation of that term. This bent is particularly noticeable in Bingham, Cook, Frank and
(with less consistency) in Llewellyn.
On the other hand legal realism has a close affinity with the various "descriptive" and
"institutional" methods applied by American scholars during the past decade in economics,
sociology and political science. In common with all these movements it has in recent years
derived much from that philosophy of life known as behavioristic psychology.
The Path of the Law, published in HOLm Es, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 167.
3
Bingham, What is the Law? (1912) ii MicH. L. REv. I, 109. While one finds the core
of the realist approach in these early articles of Bingham, it is hardly fair to class Bingham with the modern realist school. The principal difference between him and them, as I
see it, consists in the fact that he does not, either expressly or impliedly, set up a principle of
exclusion. He sought to broaden the field of the legal scholar's research, not to rule anything out of it. The relation between his approach and that of the more recent exponents of
legal realism is analogous to that existing between the early experimental psychologists and
modem behaviorists. The early experimentalists insisted that muscular reactions ought to
be studied; the behaviorist insists that nothing else is worthy of study. Bingham insisted
that we ought to observe what courts actually do without assuming that what they do corresponds exactly with what they say; the left-wingers of legal realism seem to assume that
this neutral observation of official behavior constitutes the whole of legal science.
(429)
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to concerted and sustained "vocal behavior",-that it has become, in a word,
a movement.
Even yet the movement reveals rather conspicuously the defects of
youth. It has lived so far largely by the process of discounting its own
future. There have been manifestoes, programs for action. There have
been discussions of the proper "approach",-conducted for the most part
at a respectful distance from the problems to be approached. Recently
there have appeared scattered applications of the approach. But we lack
as yet a comprehensive work which will both describe and apply the methods
of legal realism, which can serve both as an exposition of the approach and
as an exemplification of it. We have nothing which could be compared, let
us say, to Geny's four volume Science et Technique 4 which rounded off a
movement for the reform of legal method in Europe.
The nearest approach to such a work is to be found in a book recently
published by Professor Llewellyn. 5 It was this book which furnished the
stimulus for the present article. Though the remarks which follow are
intended as a critical evaluation of legal realism generally, attention will be
chiefly centered on Llewellyn and the book just mentioned. There are
several justifications for this course. As the realists themselves insist, there
is no realist "school". 6 The movement represents a variety of points of
view; it has its left and right wings. An attempt to criticize the movement
as a whole within the limits of a law review article would break down under
the weight of qualification required to take into account the divergencies in
the views of particular realists. On the other hand, by centering attention
on the work of a single individual we may secure a point of orientation from
which the entire movement may be surveyed. There are, it seems to me,
good reasons why Llewellyn is entitled to be regarded as the man most
representative of the movement as a whole. In the first place, despite the
contrary impression sometimes created by his impulsive literary style, he is
not a radical. His realism is distinctly of the middle-of-the-road variety.
Furthermore, he has written extensively and his writings constitute a more
or less comprehensive exposition of the realist view. Finally, more than
any other realist he has been willing to expose the premises which are implied in his approach. He is a "philosopher" in the sense that he has the
intellectual temerity to reveal the hidden springs of his convictions,-at least
most of the time.
'Frangois Geny,

SciExcE Er TECHrNIQUE EN DRorr PRIVL POSlIF (1913-I924).
PRXJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA, EINE SPRUcEAUSWAHL AUT BESPRECHUNG (1933). A review of this book appears elsewhere in the present

LLEWmVELLYN,

issue of this REvmw. See page 551.
'Llewellyn, supra note I, at 1254; Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science (931)
31 COL. L. REv. 925. If in the course of this article I occasionally slip and refer to the
"realist school" the offended realist is invited to substitute the word "movement" for
"school". He should, however, remember that most schools have been started by men who
protested their innocence of any desire to sectarianize their teachings.
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Professor Underhill Moore with his "institutional approach" has given
the realist movement a significant, and in some respects symptomatic turn
which deserves a place in any criticism of the movement. Though Llewellyn's writings betray a certain sympathy for the "institutional approach",
Moore's contribution remains distinctive enough to require special treatment. Accordingly a section of this article will be devoted to an analysis
of his studies. 7

In what follows I make no claim to dispose of all the questions raised
by the realist movement, nor even of all of those raised by the writings of
Llewellyn and Moore." I have, however, attempted to select for discussion those problems which seem most intimately involved in the movement
as a whole. While, as I have indicated, attention throughout is directed
primarily to Llewellyn's work (supplemented to some extent by Moore's
studies), I think that most of what I have to say may be applied, with some
qualifications and shifts of emphasis, to the position of other legal realists.
Legal Certainty
In one of the most interesting and penetrating portions of his recent
book Llewellyn takes up the question of legal certainty.9 He does not
follow the example of those realists who attempt to ridicule this problem out
of existence. For him the demand for certainty is something more than
evidence of a childish petulance, unworthy of the twentieth century mind.
Legal certainty is treated as a genuine social value, and the inquiry whether
case law produces it is considered as having an important bearing on the
merits of the system as a whole.
Llewellyn takes a needed distinction between: (i) predictability of
judicial decision, and (2) the ready availability of the materials upon which
prediction is based.' 0 The first is a matter of legal certainty, the second a
matter of legal "system". A body of law may be systematized to a very high
degree-so that a lawyer can turn at once to the relevant section of a code,
See infra, P. 453.

'The reader will find valuable and somewhat comprehensive criticisms of the realist
movement in CoEEN, LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1933) 198-247, 357-362 and Passim;
Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, Their Application and
Elaboration (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 833, 1052; and Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 697.
Llewellyn's answer to the criticism of Dean Pound, which he terms "realistic", seems to
me the antithesis of realism. Somne Realism about Realism, supra note I. Llewellyn finds
the refutation of Dean Pound's criticisms in the fact that (I) the realists have never expressed in so many words the implications which Pound drew from their writings, (2) when
a realist reads his own articles he fails to discover these implications in them. It is interesting to speculate what things could be proved by this method. One could prove that the neorealist movement in American philosophy is not interested in epistemology, that the New
Testament does not in any essential contradict the Old. One could even prove that Dean
Pound himself is innocent of the oft-repeated charge of Hegelianism.
o Op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 55-61.
oId. § 6o.
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for example-without this implying certainty in the prediction of judicial
action. On the other hand (and this may be a characteristic of case law),
the materials on which prediction must be based may be scattered and difficult of access, without this implying that prediction, when finally arrived at,
may not have a high degree of accuracy.
It is well to have these two notions explicitly separated. There is often
a too ready assumption that "system" necessarily implies predictability, and
that predictability is impossible without a highly developed "system". On
the other hand, it seems to me that Llewellyn goes too far in assuming that
the two are completely independent. Surely "system" has generally been
something more than a mere indexing device having no connection with the
process of decision. As a matter of fact is it not clear that an indexing
system which was entirely dissociated from the judicial process would
necessarily fail of its own limited purpose?
A more significant contribution to the problem of certainty is found
in Llewellyn's distinction between certainty for the attorney and certainty
for the layman. For the attorney certainty means predictability of judicial
action. It is often assumed that the layman's interest here is identical with
that of the lawyer. Llewellyn points out that this is not true. I translate
his argument:
So much for the lawyer. Incomparably more important seems to
.
It must
me to be the legal certainty which the layman demands..
not be forgotten that the ordinary layman guides his conduct not by
legal norms but by social norms. Often these social norms are similar
to those of the law. Seldom is correspondence complete. Legal rules
can hardly serve as a guide to life. On the other hand the continuous
reshaping and reformulation of social norms ... does not cease because
lawyers have set up legal rules. . . . Legal certainty in business and
for the layman does not lie in the fact that an attorney can predict the
outcome of a law suit. . . . This sort of calculability is not so important
for the layman; it means for him only legal certainty in a particular
piece of litigation. For him legal certainty consists rather in the fact
that the transaction which he has entered, if it gets into litigation, will
be adjudged as a prudent man (that is, a prudent layman in the particular
circumstances) would have foreseen, if he had had in mind at the very
beginning the unforeseen dispute. 1 '
Legal certainty for the layman is not predictability of judicial decision,
12
between legal rules and the ways of life.
congruence
is
it
'Id. § 58. (If the word "certainty" seems somewhat inappropriate to describe the notion
here involved, it should be said that Llewellyn uses the German word Siclwrleit which has
a somewhat broader connotation than the word certainty and might have been translated here
as "security".)
' The phraseology here is mine, not Llewellyn's. I say "congruence" instead of "correspondence" because I take it Llewellyn does not insist that legal rules be formuliated in the
same way as social norms but only that they have ultimately the same points of reference,-that they "come to the same thing in the end".
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Furthermore, this kind of certainty cannot be achieved unless legal
rules change. Congruence with lay ways demands a constant reshaping of
legal rules, since social norms are continually changing.' 3
This distinction between lay certainty and lawyer's certainty seems to
me to be most useful and I have no desire to comment on it, except to express
a doubt whether "lay norms" are quite so definite and clear-cut as Llewellyn
seems to assume and to suggest that the task of determining the congruence
14
of law and the ways of life is not so simple as he seems to imply.
There is, however, another point about legal certainty which Llewellyn
does not discuss at any length, but which it seems to me deserves careful
consideration. I mean the question, what will be the probable effect on legal
certainty, i. e., on "lawyer's legal certainty", of an adoption by courts of the
approach recommended by the realist school? The realist school has generally evaded this question, not because it was embarrassed by it, but because
it considered it unimportant. One realist tells us that the really enlightened
and normal person takes a "positive delight in the hazardous, incalculable
character of life", and regards "life's very insecurity" as its "most inviting
aspect".'* The implication seems to be that for the person free from psychic
repression legal uncertainty, far from being a source of concern, is really a
source of delight.
I have already pointed out that Llewellyn does not embrace this leftwing view. On the other hand, he seems somewhat hesitant to claim that
his own approach will create greater certainty than that produced by the
I LLEWEE.YN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 83. Llewellyn acknowledges that the two kinds of
certainty (certainty for the layman and certainty ,for the lawyer) tend to coalesce, as it were,
in those situations where every step of a business transaction is guided by legal counsel. Here
lay certainty is a reflection of lawyer's certainty. Llewellyn adds this further observation:
In those situations where lawyer guidance is customary there is no great danger of a lack of
correspondence between legal rules and social norms. The legal profession is here forced to
gain an insight into changing social relations. This collective insight of the profession will
tend, in some measure at least, to keep law in step with life.
In the field of lawyer-guided transactions a kind of double safeguard exists. If there
is a lack of correspondence between lay ways and the law this is rendered harmless through
the guidance of the lawyer. There is not likely to be such a lack of correspondence because
the legal profession here cannot be ignorant of the demands of life. Both of these safeguards
are absent in the case of those transactions ordinarily undertaken without legal advice.
Llewellyn might have added that there is perhaps still another reason why a lack of correspondence between law and life is unlikely in the field of lawyer-guided transactions. Is it
not possible that the conservative influence of the lawyer may have operated to retard social
change in these fields?
This whole discussion recalls an observation of Ihering's, that Roman law was workable
in spite of its technicality because of the omnipresence of the lawyer, whose services were
open to all-gratis. Where legal counsel was not likely to be available (on the battle field,
for example) various legal requirements were relaxed.
ed. 1923) 11.2, 417.

GEIST DES R6miscHEN RECHTS (7th

" Underhill Moore's valiant attempt to determine the degree of this congruence in the
field of banking law is evidence of the difficulties of the task. Moore and Sussman, Legal
and InstitutionalMethods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts (1931) 40 YALE L. 3.
381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219. In spite of the elaborateness of the method the results of this
research seem to me to remain inconclusive.
3.

FRAiN,

LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)

17.
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method generally followed by courts 1 6 In this it seems to me that he and
the rest of the realist school have overlooked one of the strongest arguments
against the traditional approach.
One of the chief characteristics of the traditional method is that it conceives of the area of the legally relevant as quite limited. Only certain types
of argument, certain lines of reasoning, are "legal" in nature. Other arguments, other modes of reasoning may have relevance to the decision and
may even be taken collaterally into account in deciding the case. But they
remain "extra-legal" or "non-technical" considerations, mere (sic) arguments of "policy". They definitely occupy a humbler status than "legal"
considerations. One of the chief services of the realist school has been to
enlarge the field of the legally relevant and to invest "extra-legal" considerations with a species of respectability. 17 And it seems quite clear to
me that this has also been a service to the cause of legal certainty.
The traditional method furnished the judge with a set of legal concepts
and said to him, "These are the materials from which you are to build your
decision. We realize that in reaching your decision you have been influenced
by numerous considerations, many of which have nothing to do with these
materials. We are willing to wink at that. But we insist on one condition:
When you come to the actual work of construction, you must limit yourself
to these materials." But suppose that by no amount of manipulation and
ingenuity can the materials furnished be made to build the structure planned.
What will happen then? Will the plan be revised? Or will the judge break
through the taboo and get what he needs elsewhere? Here lies the source
of a great deal of legal uncertainty. And here the uncertainty is directly
attributable to the restraints imposed by the "traditional method"'."
In a pamphlet which served as a sort of manifesto for the free law
movement Kantorowicz drew an analogy between the "torture" which modern judges inflict on codes to wring from them the results they consider
just and convenient, and the literal torture which judges in the middle ages
inflicted on persons accused of crime.' 9 There is a surprising parallel be"At the end of section 55 (op. cit. supranote 5) he asserts somewhat cautiously that the
freer method of decision he advocates will produce a more "effective" legal certainty than the
method generally followed. This is preceded by a statement that the freer method will not
"endanger" legal certainty.
'It would, of course, be foolish to give the entire credit for this change in attitude to
the realist school.
'8 Llewellyn has himself recognized this source of uncertainty in the "traditional method".
In 1931 he wrote, "But a fair portion of present unpredictability is certainly attributable to
the fact that the courts are using official formulas which fit, only part of the time, what the
facts seem to call for. Sometimes the facts win, sometimes the formula." Llewellyn, supra
note I, at 1241, n. 45. The idea is also adumbrated in a note in his most recent work. Op.
cit. suprc note 5, at 77 n. 3. It is significant that the discussion of the point is in both instances relegated to a footnote.
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tween the two phenomena. The middle ages feared and distrusted the
judge, particularly the judge sitting in criminal cases. It was thought dangerous to give him much discretion. The law, expressing this common distrust of judges, permitted the conviction of a criminal only when guilt was
proved in certain ways, principally by the confession. This was intended to
provide a guaranty that no man should be convicted unless the proof of his
guilt was clear and certain. This was the legal theory. The practice is more
generally known. What actually happened was that the judge first made up
his mind-on the basis of what was then "extra-legal" evidence-whether
the accused was guilty. If the decision went against the accused he was
put on the rack and compelled to give up, in the form of a confession, the
legally acceptable evidence of his guilt.
The traditional conception of legal method imposes a like hypocrisy
on the modern judge. Often his procedure is to decide the case first on the
basis of "non-technical" considerations. Then armed, not with rack and
wheel, but with the intellectual equivalents of those instruments of torturefictions, analogies, "theories",-he proceeds to wring from his code or other
body of doctrine the legally acceptable basis for his decision. The medieval
institution of torture was eliminated by the simple expedient of permitting
the judge more freedom in passing on the sufficiency of evidence. The
intellectual torture which our courts inflict on legal doctrine will be obviated
when we have brought ourselves to the point where we are willing to accept
as sufficient justification for a decision the "non-technical" considerations
which really motivated it.
This millenium, when it arrives, will bring not only a humanitarian
reform in our treatment of legal doctrine, but also, I feel sure, greater certainty in the prediction of judicial action. For there are hazards involved
in the procedure of putting legal doctrine on the rack which were not involved
in the medieval institution. Legal doctrine can sometimes be very stubborn.
It may hold its lips tight in spite of all our efforts and ingenuity. Furthermore the modern judge, unlike his medieval predecessor, has the unpleasant
duty of spreading on the public record a written description of the process
of torture itself. This puts something of a damper on the intellectual inquisition. And all of these things add to the uncertainties of the process.
In the usual course in personal property the student is introduced to
certain cases which are intended to develop a concept of "possession",usually with especial reference to the law of wild animals. He studies
the case of the harpooned whale, the case of the intercepted fox hunt, and
many others. 20 After the "doctrines" involved in these cases have been
' I think it could be demonstrated that more money is spent by the law schools of the
United States in teaching the juristic aspects of fox-hunting than is spent in the actual pursuit of that ancient and worthy sport itself.
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thoroughly digested the instructor puts a series of hypothetical cases-on
an ascending scale of temptation, as it were-to test the student's fidelity
to the legal doctrine he has absorbed. A great favorite is this case. Two
men, A and B, happen to be hunting in the same swamp. Neither is aware
of the other's presence. A shoots a duck; it lands in the arms of the surprised B. Whose duck is it? I used to put this case to my classes and I
generally found a fairly even split of opinion. One group-those who stood
steadfast for "legal principle"-were sure it was B's duck because he alone
had the requisite Power to Control. The other group were sure it was A's
duck, and, though they were less articulate about their reasons, they intimated a doubt as to B's Intent to Possess. After this discussion had gone
on for some time, I used to make it a practice to say, "Suppose you knew
no law and had never read the cases in the casebook. Whose duck would
you say it was?" Immediately there was a subsidence of feelings and argument gave way to complete unanimity. It was A's duck. Why? Because
he shot him.
. Now I am not arguing that this is a proper kind of reason, legal or
"extra-legal", to assign for a decision, though with some elaboration I think
it might be expanded into a respectable argument for the decision in favor
of A. Nor am I urging inarticulate intuition as a proper basis for judicial
decision. What I am trying to say is that from the standpoint of legal
certainty no rationalization at all may be better than a poor rationalization.
Legal scholars are, of course, generally aware that there is danger in hasty
systematization. But it is usually assumed that this danger consists merely
in the possibility that "system" may work hardship in the individual case.
It is ordinarily supposed that even bad "system" will at least carry the compensating advantage of greater certainty. 2' This assumption is demonstrably false. In the illustration I have given "legal theory", far from producing certainty, destroyed a certainty and uniformity which was already
present. And in how many fields of the law is this not true?
When lawyers gather informally and argue about the probable outcome of a case pending before a court, about what does their argument
usually turn? (I am supposing a case outside the field of public law, a case
without any marked "political" complexion.)
Do they argue about the
judge's conception of proper business policy, about his social philosophy,
about how he would decide the case if he were a layman? They may, but
they are not likely to. More often their argument will turn on this kind of
' This assumption is made in most of the discussions of the various RESTAT mENTS of
the American Law Institute. Professor Havighurst has pointed out that a RESTATEMENT
may bring about uncertainty when it produces a stress in the judicial process such as is described above. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 27 ILI. L.
REV. 9IO, 917.
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question: Will the judge take a "technical" vieW, or will he yield to "non22
technical" considerations? This is the source of their uncertainty.
Perhaps I can sum up my discussion with a simile. If you put an animal in too small an enclosure you may rely on it that he will make a violent
effort to escape. There is no way of predicting whether he will succeed in
this effort, or where he will go if he breaks out. If you put him in a larger
enclosure you may be reasonably sure that he will be content to stay inside
the enclosure. And if you study your animal's habits closely you will be
able to follow his movements within the enclosure and discover regularities
in them. What we need, as I see it, is a larger grazing area for judges. The
realists are bringing this about, and they ought to realize that in doing so
they are making the judge a more tractable and predictable animal.
The traditional method places a stigma on "non-technical" considerations. This tends to produce uncertainty for a reason which I have attempted
to demonstrate, namely, that we have no way of predicting when the judge
will break through the taboo imposed on him. It also tends to produce
uncertainty in another way. It prevents these "non-technical" considerations
from being talked and written about. It prevents their possible rationalization and systematization.
In our metropolitan centers the work of trial judges is frequently
specialized. One judge will hear only criminal cases, another domestic relations cases, etc. From time to time it will be necessary to transfer a judge
to a class of cases he is not in the habit of trying. This generally produces
some consternation among attorneys practicing in the court. They know
they are in for a period of legal uncertainty. This may, of course, be due
to the judge's ignorance of legal doctrine. More often it is due to his
ignorance of the glosses practice has put on legal doctrine. Often there is
no way for him to learn of these glosses-these compromises that law has
made with life--except to retrace the experience of his predecessors. He
finds by the method of trial and error what needs to be read between the
lines. Meanwhile litigants receive arbitrary treatment and legal certainty
suffers. Now a legal method, such as the realist school proposes, which
would recognize these glosses and compromises as falling within the province
of legal science would tend to eliminate this source of uncertainty. If these
things were written and talked about the judge might not have to acquire
them in the uncertain and painful way he does. Not only that. If these
things were openly discussed we should be in a position to attempt a rational
and critical evaluation of them. Out of this evaluation would come greater
certainty and greater justice for litigants.
' Of course, I realize that this sort of question would still exist, though to a less extent,
under a more liberal and realistic conception of legal method. For example, in the interpretation of requirements of formality there is always room for difference of opinion as to
how strictly a requirement should be applied.
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Of course, I realize that there will always remain a fringe of practice
which will not get into books. There are many reasons why this is so. But
the fact remains that many things are not talked about and do not get into
books for the rather prudish reason that they are not supposed to be "law",
-though it is admitted they have a tremendous influence on judicial decision.
The absence of these things from books, the fact that they must be "picked
up", introduces an element of uncertainty in the law which might, in part
at least, be remedied by the general adoption of a more liberal conception
of the province of legal science.
Case Law v. Code Law
The American legal realist, though in obvious conflict with his environment, enjoys an advantage usually denied to revolters against things as they
are. He is fundamentally satisfied with the "system" under which he lives.
The Anglo-American system of case law is entirely to his liking. It fits
into his pragmatic conception of legal method. Whatever evils it may seem
to display are due not to the system itself but to perversions of it, to the
ogre Conceptualism which has taken possession of it. 23 Perhaps this affinity
for case law explains why the American legal realist has displayed so little
interest in European legal speculation. European realists and near realistsmen like Ihering, Geny, Duguit, Ehrlich, Wurzel, Bozi, Sternberg, Kantorowicz, and Radburch-f or the most part go unnoticed in this country.
It would require no elaborate demonstration to show that the realist's
assumption of the superiority of the American case system has generally
been based on no actual investigation of the workings of case law as compared with code law. The "pragmatism" which intuitively prefers the case
method exhausts itself in the preference,--it is not applied to determine
whether the preference has any empirical justification. This a priori pragmatism is not found in Llewellyn's recent book. Partly because the nature of
his task demanded it, and partly because his own inquiring temperament led
him in that direction, he attempts here something new in the literature of
realism: a painstaking examination of the way case law actually operates. He
begins by raising an issue of fundamental importance. I translate his own
phrasing of the question. "How does it come about that a system of law
which develops out of fortuitously selected cases can develop in a way that
is tolerable from a political or social point of view? Why does not such a
legal system become a planless, orderless chaos of doctrine?" 24
' It has even been suggested that the deficiencies of case law are traceable to "a wave of
continental learning [which at one time] swept over England, leaving a thick deposit of its
obscurant abstractions, . . ." Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 6 A-At. L.
ScHooL REv. 215, 221. Later in America the process was repeated and "Great cargoes of
continental speculations were imported and thrown in to make the dikes of the old abstractions hold." Ibid. In this way the pristine pragmatism of our Anglo-Saxon fathers was
debauched, and our law became abstract and conceptual.
2 Op. cit. supra note 5, at 98.

AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM

Under our precedent system courts do not regard themselves as free
to anticipate the need for legal rules; they manufacture rules ad hoc only,
for the particular case in litigation. But what issues will get into litigation?
This depends on the interest of individual litigants, and there is, therefore,
no way of predicting or controlling the kind of questions which will be the
subject of adjudication. In consequence it might appear inevitable that our
case law would be spotty and incomplete. A developing field of business
practice may be in urgent need of legal direction and control, yet the purely
fortuitous circumstance that no individual happens to have an interest in litigation may bring it about that no cases are decided in the field and in consequence no "law" is made.
Now as a matter of fact we know that things do not work out quite
as badly as this theory would make it appear. Where legal direction is
needed it is generally forthcoming. There are hiatuses in our law, to be
sure, but they are neither so numerous nor so extensive as one might be led
to suppose in view of the apparently planless way in which our law grows.
In spite of its dependence on the past, in spite of the lack of conscious direction over its growth, our system of case law has generally proved itself capable of meeting new social conditions. How does this come about?
Llewellyn solves this problem in a way one might have anticipated.
Litigation is not purely a matter of chance and individual interest. Litigation arises out of conflict. Conflict in turn arises in those fields of social
activity where growth is taking place, where the relative strength of interestgroups is changing. Things are so arranged that where changing social
practice demands new law individual interest will see to it that suits will
be brought which will furnish a substratum for the elaboration of the needed
doctrine. There is happily a kind of automatic correlation between the
interest of the individual litigant and the social need for new law.
That there is an element of truth in Llewellyn's solution of this problem
is pretty obvious. It is equally obvious that the solution is partial and incomplete. The correlation between the interest of the individual litigant
and the interest of society in legal development-like the correlation assumed
by classical economics between the individual economic interest and the
common good-is unfortunately far from complete. It is scarcely necessary
to demonstrate that our courts' piece-meal and backward-looking system of
legislating frequently proves inadequate to meet the need for legal control in
fields where social practices are changing rapidly. There are many reasons
why this should be so. If the growth in social practice is at all rapid it is likely
that with our crowded court calendars case law cannot keep up with it.
Again, though the change in social life may involve the interests of whole
sections of the population, the pecuniary interest of any individual may be
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so slight as to make litigation (or at least appeal to the upper courts)
25
impracticable.
I do not for a moment believe that Llewellyn meant to assert any
complete and nature-given coincidence between the interest of the individual
litigant and the social need for new law. Perhaps he would recognize the
need for the qualifications suggested here. But if that is so it must be
confessed that his own treatment of the subject leaves too much to inference and presents, at most, intimations of the darker side of case law.
After proving that case law will, or is likely to, grow to meet new
social conditions, Llewellyn points out that there are things which may
operate to prevent that growth from being a healthy one. Often a whole
field of law is influenced permanently by the particular turn taken by the
first case arising in the field. This case may have carried a certain factual
and ethical complexion which was actually the determinative element in its
decision. The court in deciding it, however, may lay down a categorical
rule which subsequently becomes divorced from the particular circumstances
of its first utterance and controls perhaps hundreds of cases which from an
ethical or "factual" viewpoint are quite different from the first and "critical"
case. There is an even more sinister possibility. Organized interest-groups,
aware of the importance of such critical cases, may see to it that these cases
"come up in the right way". Thus by the expenditure of a little money and
An example of this is to be found in the field of what is called "industrial insurance".
The history of regular life insurance, on the other hand, justifies pretty well Llewellyn's optimism concerning the ability of case law to deal with new situations. A whole new
field of social practice grew up with life insurance and, as was inevitable, all sorts of abuses
grew up with it. A priori one might argue that this is the kind of situation case law is not
adequate to meet. Yet we know that, in general, the courts saw that the problem of life insurance was really a new problem, and they remade the law to fit this new field. They refused to apply in this new field the supposedly fundamental principles of contract, tort and
agency law-not, to be sure, without causing some distress to the student writers of law review notes.
The history of standard life insurance is repeating itself, so far as social practice is concerned, in what is called "industrial insurance". Industrial insurance is written in small
amounts (say $1oo to $500). Premiums are collected weekly. The policy is issued without
a medical examination, though not without warranties concerning the health of the insured
sufficiently inclusive to make most of the policies issued void if these warranties were taken
literally. It is no exaggeration to say that the abuses which have arisen out of this type of
insurance are appalling. Many of the policies are so worded as to bind the companies to
practically nothing. Not infrequently a large portion of the premium is paid for disability
insurance which is cancellable at any tinw by the company. Of course, the practice is not as
bad as these provisions might imply. But it is bad enough. And all of these social abuses
are growing up without judicial curb. Why? For the very obvious reason that the amounts
involved are too small to attract lawyers to undertake litigation. The man of moderate means,
who takes out regular life insurance, has been freed from abuses of this sort by the courtseven if the courts have had to hurt the juristic sensibilities of legal theorists in order to do it.
But the poor man remains a victim of the rapaciousness of the less responsible insurance
companies. Is not the general indifference toward his plight in some part the product of our
faith in the capacity of case law to take care of new problems? We think in terms of case
law, and we assume that the need for statutory reform is not really pressing untit it makes
itself manifest in the decisions.
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effort at the right time the whole future development of a field of law may
2

be influenced .

6

Llewellyn fails to mention another element of contingency in the growth
of case law which it seems to me is necessary to complete the picture. I
refer to the fact that it is a matter of chance in what order cases will arise,
and what the doctrinal connection will be between the cases which do arise
and those already decided. Just as a whole field of law may be influenced
by the accidental presence of a particular case at a particular stage of its
development, so a whole field of law may be influenced by the accidental
absence of a decision which might serve as a sort of doctrinalbridge between
existing rules and needed new law.
The case of Shuey v. United States 27 decided that the published offer
of a reward might be effectively revoked by an announcement given equal
publicity. Pollock in his treatise on contracts admits the reasonableness of
the decision but adds the remark that it "seems a rather strong piece of
judicial legislation". 2 s Why this? Because previous decisions had declared
that a revocation takes effect only when "communicated". This revocation
had not been "communicated" since it had never come to the knowledge of
the claimant of the reward. Now suppose that there had intervened between these previous decisions and the case of Shuey v. United States a case
in which a letter of revocation had been promptly delivered at the place of
business of the offeree and had been allowed to remain unopened on his
desk. Without much question a court would have held that such a revocation was "communicated" so soon as the offeree had had a fair opportunity
to become familiar with it. And had such a case existed before the Shuey
case is it likely that anyone would have regarded that decision as a "strong
piece of judicial legislation"? Pollock's attitude was influenced by the purely
fortuitous circumstance that there did not exist a case which could operate
to carry his mind, without shock, from the older cases to the decision in the
Shuey case.
The possibility that a doctrinal bridge may be lacking represents, then,
an additional element of fortuity in the development of case law, operating
to make the litigant's rights depend on the chronological order in which his
case comes up. Furthermore it is an element which is especially likely to
be operative in fields where social practice is changing rapidly. Social practice may change so rapidly that by the time cases actually get into litigation
-' LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supranote 5, at Ioo.
This notion of the "critical" case is obviously
realism of the right-wing variety. It assumes that the "vocal behavior" of courts has a significant influence over the judicial process. Llewellyn has elsewhere declared that the position
on which some realists verge, that "rules" have no influence over judges at all, escapes his
understanding. Llewellyn, supra note i, at 1241 n. 46.
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they are so far removed from what the court is familiar with that the court
is left without any intellectual conduit to carry it from the old to the new.
It may be argued that the need for "doctrinal bridges" is not a peculiar
fault of the case system, and that the whole thing can be reduced to a psychological truism, that men's minds hesitate at making violent jumps. This may
be so, but I think it can be shown that this native intellectual skittishness
of man is aggravated by the methods of reasoning necessitated in a system
of case law. Under a code courts are, of course, faced with the same
problem that faces our common-law courts, that of deciding cases which do
not fall within existing doctrine. But the procedure under code law is
generally to bring the unforeseen situation within some very general provision of the code, vague enough not to interfere with the proper decision
of the case and just definite enough to appear to give the court some support.
Where a large number of such general provisions are available, as they are
in most codes, "doctrinal bridges" are not necessary. The statute itself will
carry you anywhere you want to go. The doctrinal bridge becomes important in a system of code law where a somewhat specific provision is
gradually extended to cover situations not originally comprehended within
it. Here the order in which cases come up is important, and if the cases
which lie just beyond the literal meaning of the section arise first, the
process of extension will be accelerated. In a system of case law we have,
for the most part, nothing corresponding to the catch-all provisions found
in codes. Of course, one will find laid down in the cases some rather broad
and general principles, but their apparent scope is generally limited by being
given a point of reference in the particular case at hand. Such general
principles as we have in case law lack the authoritative force which backs
a statutory enactment. They are apt to be relegated to Austin's field of
"positive morality". They are not quite law. The full force of precedent
applies only to the particular decision. All this means that the doctrinal
bridge will necessarily play a more important r6le in case law than it does
under a code. And, as I attempted to show, it is an alogical, fortuitous
factor.
Incidentally this whole discussion gives point to a statement once made
by Ihering which would probably be disturbing to the orthodoxy of most
realists. 29 The statement was that Roman law was great because it was
built upon a system of "case law" which did not discriminate between real
and hypothetical cases. The jurisconsults gave answer to all cases put to
them, without inquiring whether they were real. This gave a continuity to
the body of doctrine which they developed which cannot exist where only
"real" cases are dealt with.
' GEIST DES ROMISCREN RECHTS (4th ed. 1858) 11.2, 385-386.

AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM

Legal Rules and the Nature of Concepts
An attitude of scepticism toward rules has characterized the realist
movement from the beginning. This scepticism rests on two closely related
grounds. The first lies in a conviction that "reality" is a thing too complex, tumultuous, and vital to be kept in a straight-jacket of rules. I shall
deal with this aspect of the realist's scepticism later under the heading Law
and Society. The other ground for his distrust of rules lies not so much
in a belief in the impossibility of the task imposed on rules as in a belief in
the essential impotence of rules themselves. Rules are made up of concepts,
and concepts are but the shadowy figments of our own minds, wholly unworthy of the simple faith the conceptualist places in them. It is with this
aspect of the realist's scepticism that we are here concerned. 30
The realist movement has done an immense service to American legal
science in inculcating in it a healthy fear of such very real demons as
Reified Abstractions, Omnibus Concepts, and Metaphors Masquerading as
Facts. 31 One seldom encounters a law review article today of the type so
common ten years ago, in which the writer starts with an inquiry into the
"nature" of some legal concept and ends by deducing all sorts of important
consequences from the supposed inner nature of the concept,-without more
than a passing reference to the practical effects of his conclusions, and then
with an air of condescension, as if to compliment the facts for showing good
judgment in conforming to his theories. The outstanding foe of this sort of
verbal trifling has been Professor Cook. There can be no doubt that his
influence, and that of other realists like him, has been in the main beneficent.
On the other hand, it seems to me that we are now in danger of carrying
the crusade against "conceptualism" too far. American legal science gives
evidence that it is on the verge of making an orthodoxy of the sterile and
uninspired behavioristic philosophy which has worked such havoc in the other
social sciences. Professor Cohen has been warning against this danger for
a long time, and one only wishes his warnings had a more discernible effect.
There is so much breadth of learning and sound sense in what he has written
that I hesitate to attempt any supplementation of it. Nevertleless I think
I may contribute something in the matter of diagnosing the disease. 3 2
' Valuable criticisms of the realist's attitude toward rules will be found in CoHm, op.
cit. supra note 8, and Dickinson, supra note 8. Dickinson is not merely critical, but presents
a carefully thought-out theory of his own in which he makes use of so much of the realist
theory as he considers acceptable.
'I have attempted a contribution toward the cause myself. See Fuller, Legal Fictions

(193o-ig3i) 25 ILL. L. REv. 363, 513, 877.

'In the matter of diagnosis I feel I enjoy an advantage over Professor Cohen. I have
suffered from the disease myself. In my discussion of the "fictitious" nature of classes
(in the article cited supra note 31, at 877, 884) there is exemplified the same erroneous
assumption concerning the use of concepts in thinking that is found in Berkeley, Llewellyn
and Wurzel.
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Professor Cohen calls the rule-phobia of the left-wing legal realist
"nominalism". 3 3 Now one gets into all sorts of difficulties if one attempts
to explain just what is meant by nominalism in the ontological sense. This
is not the place to enter into that problem.3 4 Let us, therefore, use the word
nominalism frankly as a term of opprobrium, as meaning a too distrustful
attitude toward universals and abstractions. Now what is the cause of this
attitude? This is the question which has not been sufficiently examined.
We can never rid a man of a disease of thought until we know how and
why he succumbed to it. As I see it, the realist's nominalism generally arises
from an error of psychology. This error may be stated as the belief that
the individual in his own private thinking does not employ universals and
abstractions and that these things are only convenient devices for the communication of ideas. It is the notion that in the internal economy of the
mind only "things" are dealt with, and that abstractions and concepts are
simply packages of these "things" bundled together,-for export purposes,
as it were.
Nominalism is usually defined as the belief that universals exist only
in the mind of the individual. So far as the origin of the nominalist attitude
is concerned it seems to me that this inverts the thing. Nominalism starts
with the assumption that in the mind of the individual universals have no
place, that they are only a sort of social convention making language possible.
Confirmation for this theory of the psychological genesis of nominalism
is found in the fact that Berkeley, certainly the greatest nominalist who ever
lived, begins his Principles of Human Knowledge with an inquiry into the
processes of thought in the mind of the individual."5 The conclusion reached
on the basis of this psychological investigation-that abstractions cannot be
"conceived" and are mere conveniences of language-is then made the basis
for his whole philosophy.
While our legal realists have vied with Berkeley in the extremes to
which they have carried the nominalistic attitude, their distaste for "philosophic" discussions has generally led them to neglect any statement of the
basis for this attitude. It is, therefore, fortunate that in his recent book
Llewellyn has undertaken to discuss in some detail the problem of the nature
of concepts and rules. His discussion seems to me to reveal the fact that
' Op. cit. supra note 8, at 2o8-247.
'Modern epistemologists, incidentally, have developed a very neat device for dodging
the problem. It is no longer asserted that concepts and relations "exist", but it is firmly insisted that they do have "subsistence". But what is "subsistence"? Why, that is the kind of
existence that things like concepts and relations have!
' Introduction §§ 1-25. Cf. ". . . if the nominalistic logic is good it should lead us,
as it lead Berkeley, to deny that there can be any universal ideas in the mind." CoHEN, op.
cit, supra note 8, at 21o. As I have indicated, this statement seems to me to reverse the
process by which the nominalistic attitude develops.
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his fundamental error, like Berkeley's, is a psychological one. I translate a
passage from his book:
To speak of "applying the rule" is to use a misleading expression.
Rather you either fill the rule out, or put limits on it. You can only
"apply" the rule after you have first either included or excluded the case
at hand ...
Let us assume a case not involving any doubt, but a case nevertheless which would never have occurred to any one at the time the rule in
question was established. In spite of this let us assume it to be a case
which everyone, after considering it and the rule, would acknowledge
would have to be governed by the rule. Now I claim there is here no
real "interpretation" of the rule. Even here there is an enlargement, a
reformulation, an importation of something new into the rule. For
the rule consists of a series, a complex of word-symbols. In itself a
symbol is nothing. A symbol is, however, a means of pointing to things
or thought-constructs. 3 In so far as things were demonstrably aimed
at in the original use of a symbol, the symbol has from the beginning
content. Every symbol, however, has to an uncertain degree something
which we may call latent content, a capacity for expansion, as it were,
which, though partly equivocal and unforeseeable, is also in part unequivocal and foreseeable. Some things that are new, some things that
have hitherto not been thought of, are nevertheless perceived, so soon
as they are considered, to fall at once into the already established category. .

.

. In our hypothetical case every lawyer would make the same

extension. When he does that and does it at once he does not note the
extension. It appears to him as if the case had always lain within this
category, as if it had always been consciously intended that this case
should belong to the category. In spite of this he has, though unconsciously, extended the category . . . the legislator could not have in-

tended the inclusion of this case in concreto, the case was by hypothesis
not yet thought of.3
The assumption concerning the psychological nature of concepts which
underlies this discussion is, I think, demonstrably false. Suppose a legislator
' Llewellyn uses the word Gedankengebilde which, in an effort to be fair, I have translated as "thought-constructs", though it might have been translated as "mental images".
' Op. cit. supra note 5, at 72-74. Llewellyn's discussion rather closely parallels Wurzel's
treatment of "projection". WTURZEL, DAS JUUISTISCHE DExixlax (2d ed. 1924), translated in
Tian SCCE OF LEGAL METHOD (i92i) 298-428.
A similar notion, that in the Urerlebnis of the inner soul the mind is freed from the
shackles of categories and logic, is expressed in the following passage: ". . . of the many
things which have been said as to the mystery of the judicial process, the most salient is that
decision is reached after an emotive experience in which principles and logic play a secondary
part. The function of juristic logic and the principles which it employs seems to be like that
of language, to describe the event which has already transpired. These considerations must
reveal to us the impotence of general principles to control decision. Vague because of their
generality, they mean nothing save what they suggest in the organized experience of the one
who thinks them, and, because of their vagueness, they only remotely compel the organization
of that experience." Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws (' 1928 )
37 YALE L. J.468, 48o. The reader will observe that the nominalist view ("the impotence
of general principles to control decision") is here based on an hypothesis concerning the inner
processes of thought.
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enacts that it shall be a crime for anyone "to carry concealed on his person
any dangerous weapon." After the statute is passed someone invents a
machine, no larger than a fountain pen, capable of throwing a "death ray".
Is such a machine included? Obviously, yes. It falls within the "latent content" of the symbol. But does the inclusion of this new machine under the
concept "dangerous weapon" change or enlarge the concept? Yes, says
Llewellyn, because the legislator could not have intended to include it at
the time he enacted this statute since it was not then in existence. But what
did the legislator intend "in concreto"? Why are we forced to conclude
that his intent cannot extend to something not yet in existence? Would
Llewellyn contend that the "actual intent" of our legislator could not extend
to revolvers of the ordinary type manufactured after the statute was passed?
Is it impossible for a man to "intend" a gift to unborn children? Perhaps
Llewellyn has in mind the fact that it would be impossible for the legislator
to "visualize" the non-existent object when he enacted his statute. But is a
man's intent coextensive with the mental images which accompany it?
Would it be impossible for a legislator to prohibit the sale of stock in any
company organized to manufacture a perpetual motion machine unless he
could visualize the machine? In the case of our "dangerous weapon" statute
would the accident that there popped into the mind of the legislator the
picture of a Colt revolver mean that his intent excluded Smith & Wesson
revolvers? No one would contend that. We should have to say, he intended
the class "revolvers". But if he can intend the class "revolvers", why not the
class "dangerous weapons"? The fallacy underlying Llewellyn's whole discussion is the assumption that thinking must be directed toward particular
"things", when as a matter of fact, it may be, and generally is, directed
toward classes or universals.
The old notion that the application of a concept involves merely an
extraction of something already implicit within it is misleading, though it
presents in a metaphorical way one aspect of the truth.38 Exactly the same
thing can be said of Llewellyn's notion that any application to "new" situations, however obvious, effects a "change" in the concept. 39 Indeed, both
notions, in so far as they are false, rest on the same error, namely, a hypostatization of the "concept". The old notion treated the concept as an opaque
SA very readable and interesting refutation of the notion that concepts in some way
or other "develop" new meanings out of themselves will be found in i JAMES, PRINCn'I.s OF
PsYcnOLOGY (I8go) 464-468. Needless to say James does not find it necessary to embrace
the notion that any "new" application of a concept is a change in it.
' The grain of truth contained in Llewellyn's statement consists in the fact that the application of a concept usually involves a mental operation on the part of the person making the
application which did not occur in the mind of the man who first used the concept. If you
say, "Man is a wonderful being", and I say, "That statement includes Beethoven", I am
making an application of the concept "man" which probably did not "occur" to you; something has happened in my brain which did not happen in yours. But that does not mean
that I am changing your concept of "man". See i JAMES, op. cit. supra note 38, at 472.
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container with all sorts of unknown contents in its interior waiting to be
extracted. In Llewellyn's view the concept is-for the individual who uses
it-a sort of show case with its contents hung neatly in a row ready to be
inventoried at a glance. The fact is that from the standpoint of individual
psychology the concept is not a container or "thing" at all, but an activity
of the conceiving mind. The "thingifying" comes about when we convert
this mental activity into logical terms. It may be that this process of converting a dynamic activity into a static "thing" necessarily involves some
distortion. But there is no need to increase the amount of this distortion
by the gratuitous assumption that intent and thinking40 mu.st be directed
toward "things", and cannot be directed toward classes.
We shall have gone a long way toward ending the controversy concerning "nominalism" if we can secure recognition for the plain fact that the
inner mental experience of the individual, however precious and ineffable it
may be, is "conceptual". The issue will at least be clarified if we recognize
with James that we have available to us "a perfectly satisfactory decision
of the nominalistic and conceptualistic controversy, so far as it touches
psychology", and that "We must decide in favor of the conceptualists". 41
The legal realist is emphatically of those James called "tough-minded".
He loves "things",-things that are concrete, tangible, anschaulich. In
Llewellyn's own words, the realists "want law to deal, they themselves want
to deal, with things, with people, with tangibles, with definite tangibles, and
observable relations between definite tangibles-not with words alone; when
law deals with words, they want the words to represent tangibles which can
be got at beneath the words, and observable relations between those tangibles". 42 Now this intellectual bias, for it is a bias, has its value in a science
which has suffered for centuries from an unbridled pseudo-rationalism. But
like all biases the realist's peculiar bias may sometimes lead him astray. He
should remember that not all significant facts are "concrete". He needs to
be reminded that the love of the tangible and concrete, like other human
loves, may sometimes, when thwarted, fabricate its own object.
Do the Proposalsof the Realist School Relate Solely to Method?
The proponents of the realist approach have left an ambiguity in their
position which, I think, ought to be removed. Do they propose a different
kind of law, or only a different way of talking about law?
0The difficulty of expressing adequately the principles which we employ in our inner
thinking is produced, not by the fact that our inner processes of thought do not employ
concepts, but, as Dickinson points out (supra note 8, at 1064), by the fact that we often
employ in our private thinking concepts and thought-units which do not correspond exactly
to those implicit in ordinary language. The difficulty is increased by the fact that these
unnamed concepts are peculiarly evanescent. We cannot always call them back at will for
purposes of comparison and clarification.
' I JAMES, op. cit. supranote 38, at 472.
Llewellyn, .supranote I, at 1223.
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On the rare occasions when the realist discusses this question he seems
to say something like this: "I am not a philosopher. I have no interest in
developing a scheme of ethical values. My only interest lies in seeing that
the judicial process is accurately described, that it is recognized for what it
actually is. My interest is, therefore, primarily methodological, though it is
obvious that good method has a social value of its own. If the judge recognizes what he is really doing, he is less apt to be led astray by delusions as
to what he is doing."
On the other hand the enthusiasm for his position which the realist
displays seems hard to understand if this disclaimer of any interest in ethics
is accepted at its face value. When a man talks with all the zeal of the
most ardent social reformer it is difficult to assume that his interest is limited
to methodology. When the realist ridicules the "vocal behavior" of courts
as an unimportant by-product of the judicial process it is hard to believe that
his energies are concentrated on changing this "vocal behavior" and that he
has no desire to change anything else.
This ambiguity in the position of the realist ought to be removed.
Removing it would clarify discussion. It might have an even more important effect. It might reveal that the realist school-though free from
evil intent, of course-has been guilty of the crime of misbranding its intellectual wares. For I strongly suspect that the realist movement has not been
so free of "philosophic" pretensions as its proponents would have us believe.
Certainly I am not inclined to take seriously Llewellyn's occasional disclaimers that his own approach involves any distinctive ethical bias. 43
The Relation of Law and Society
One of the fundamental problems which any social philosophy must
face may be stated in a somewhat vague way as the problem of the relation
between law and society,-or, if one prefers, of the relation of Law to
Life. 44 Many of the problems of ethical philosophy, in whatever terms they
may have been expressed, will be found to center about this relationship.
The most imposing legal philosophies will often disclose themselves as involving fundamentally nothing more than a bias concerning this relation,a bias in favor of "law", or in favor of "society".
A study of Llewellyn's writings 45 convinces me that he has reached
his own solution of this problem. In discussing his solution one is under
"I make no effort here to indicate either the proper rule, or the proper action on any
legal subject." A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (1930) 30 CoT. L. REV. 431, at
463. "When the matter of program [i. e., of the realists] in the nornative aspect is raised,
the answer is: there is none." Llewellyn, supra note I, at 1254.
"Geny's distinction between the donmi and the construit states in a somewhat different
form the fundamental relation involved here and has the advantage that its terms are freer
from metaphorical contamination than those employed in the text. 4 GENY, op. cit. supra
note 4, c. 3. However, for present purposes, I have preferred to use the more common terms.
'In
the discussion which follows I draw freely from all of Llewellyn's writings, particularly from the BRAMBLE BusH (1930).
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the embarrassment that Llewellyn nowhere makes as distinct and explicit
an avowal as one might wish of the social philosophy which it implies. The
difficulty is increased by his failure to put his own view in its historical
perspective by indicating its relation to the thought of other writers. 46 There
is, therefore, of necessity some conjecture in the account I am about to give,
and I warn the reader that it is possible I have misinterpreted his views.
I shall begin by quoting a series of statements which will furnish the
background for what I have to say:
"Law and the law official are not therefore in any real sense what
makes order in society. For them society is given and order is given
because society is given.4 7 . . . The law then, the interference of
officials in disputes, appears as the means of dealing with disputes which
do not otherwise get settled. Not as making order, but as maintaining
order when it has gotten out of order. 48 . . . By and large the basic
order of our society, and for that matter in any society, is not produced
by law. 4" . . . Law plays only upon the fringes." 50
Certainly the emphasis is here placed on the "society" side of the relation. Law, the principle of conscious guidance, is relegated to the back-

" The citation of authorities is so often a form of intellectual exhibitionism that one
hesitates to criticize a man who is free from this ostentation. Yet it does seem to me that
Llewellyn errs too far in the opposite direction. I am particularly distressed at the absence
of reference to that great pioneer among "realists", Rudolph von Ihering. There are a
number of places in Llewellyn's writings where Ihering's views almost intrude themselves.
Llewellyn seems sometimes to imply that prior to American legal realism it had never
occurred to anyone to question the "ideology" of the law, or to inquire whether it coincided
with the real motivation of legal rules. Yet most of Ihering's life was devoted to ferreting
out the social reality concealed behind the "ideology" of the Roman Law. In addition to
refusing to accept the conventional formulations of the law at their face value, Ihering also
pointed out that there are frequently regularities of judicial behavior ("latent rules" he
called them) which do not appear in the rules talked and written about,-something which
Llewellyn regards as a particularly esoteric discovery of American realism. I. IHFMNG,
op. cit. supra note 13, at § 3; cf. Llewellyn, supra note 43, at 439 n. 9. Llewellyn speaks of
norms (Sollsdtze) taking on the appearance of affirmations of fact (Seinslitze). Op. cit.
supra note 5, at 89. There is no reference to Ihering's penetrating discussion of the
phenomenon. III.1 IHERING, op. cit. supra note 13, at 311-326. Beginning on page 96 of
the same book Llewellyn discusses the creation of new legal institutions, and describes the
process by which existing institutions are diverted to new purposes. A good part of his
40 YALE L. J. 7o4, is devoted to the same topic. In
article, What Price Contract? (93)
neither case is there any reference to Ihering's famous discussion of the problem. II.z
IHERING, op. cit. supra note 13, at 334-352, 504-537; 111.1 ibid., at 281-30l. The reader will
find portions of Ihering's treatment translated in my article Legal Fictions,supra note 31, at
533-535.
While I am on this subject I should like to take notice of Llewellyn's interpretation of
Ihering's theory of interests as an attempt to remove legal science still further from reality
than it already was under the notion of substantive rights. Llewellyn, supra note 43, at 441.
This interpretation is, in my opinion, nothing short of perverse.
" BRAmBL E BusH (i93o) 12.
'8 Id. at 13.
"Id. at Hx2.
.r'Id. at 113.
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ground, and becomes a kind of midwife called in occasionally to assist the
processes of nature, but having no hand in the act of creation itself. 5'
I do not contend, of course, that Llewellyn denies altogether any creative
r6le to law. Though he emphasizes the "power of society over courts", he
admits that there is another side to the thing which occasionally manifests
itself: "the power of courts over society". 5 2 -le recognizes that sometimes
even a single legal decision may shape the growth of an institution,5 3 and
that men "often do orient the action which they take apart from litigation"
on the basis of legal rules. 54 Llewellyn himself, then, qualifies the broad
statements I have quoted previously. It cannot be asserted that he does not
see the whole picture. What I fear is that he may suffer from a species of
color blindness which causes him to see one part of the picture with especial
vividness while the rest fades into an indistinct background. The aspect of
the relation of law and society which he constantly chooses for categorical
assertion is "the power of society over courts". The qualifications come
later, too late to restore a proper balance of emphasis.
This bias on the side of "society" is evidenced in many parts of Llewellyn's work. It is illustrated in his theory that case law will, in a more or less
automatic fashion, develop in those places where social change demands it.55
It is found in his conception of the "pathological case" as the case "so exceptional that the normal ways of society afford . . . no solid basis for deciding
[it] . . . " "' The implication is that the ordinary, "non-pathological" case

can and should find its regulation in the "normal ways of society". The same
attitude is found in his discussion of legal certainty. "Layman's legal certainty" is identified with the congruence of law and social norms, and it is
assumed, not only that law should generally conform to the "ways of life",
5T
but that these ways afford a substantial basis for judicial decision.
This emphasis on the society side of the relation is also found in
Llewellyn's constant insistence that the legal scholar's first task must be to
master in its last detail the whole pattern of human behavior before he
attempts to prescribe regulations for it. This insistence that "value judgments" be postponed until we have traced out exhaustively the whole
labyrinth of social norms certainly involves itself a "value judgment", howDean Pound has pointed out the similarity between the "juristic pessimism" which the
realist movement seems to imply and the views of the historical school and the positivists.
Pound, supra note 8, at 703.
BRAMBLE BUSH1 (1930) 55.
Ibid.
Id. at 54.
LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 98.
r Id. at 82. BRAMBLE BuSH (1930) 54.
LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 81.
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ever much Llewellyn may protest the rigid exclusion of "ought" from his
approach. If I tell a sculptor that he must spend twenty years investigating
the physical and chemical structure of the clay used in modelling before
he takes up the study of modelling itself, it will hardly do for me to say I am
not teaching sculpture. I shall be judged by the effects of my instructions.
The man who has spent most of his life studying clay will be a different
kind of sculptor from the man who has devoted more of his time to the art
of modelling. There is no a priori reason for supposing he will be a better
sculptor. If I assume he will be, it must be because of some notion I have
concerning the relative importance of clay and modelling in the process of
sculpturing.5 s
If I have to choose someone to draft a statute regulating the banking
business I may put a high value on a knowledge of banking practice. I may
regard as the ideal man for the task the man who knows the practices of
the banking world so thoroughly that he can predict with certainty the
psychological reactions which the sight of a postdated check will invoke in
any banking employee, from messenger boy to president. I may prefer him
to a man who, though less familiar with the behavior of bank employees, has
spent his life studying the history and theory of banks and banking law, and
many hours in arm-chair reflection on the possible ways of organizing and
controlling the banking business. I am entitled to my preference. But I
am not entitled to escape responsibility for it by saying it involves no "value
judgment", no philosophy of what ought to be.
I do not deny that Llewellyn's bias for the society side of the relation
may answer to a real need in our law. Lawyers have been too prone to think
of society as mere clay in the hands of the "Law". Our courts too often
talk as if their task were merely to cut channels, largely after a design of
their own fancy, through which the waters of life are expected to flow inertly
and complaisantly. To this conception Llewellyn offers a needed antidote.
But it is wise to remember that antidotes can be administered too liberally,
and that in the case at hand there is danger we may escape one simplification
only to fall victims to another.
There are two extreme, and therefore simple, ways of conceiving of
the relation of law and society. "Law" can be conceived of as the active
principle operating to shape an inert element "society". This is the view
toward which the imperative school tends, and it is the view tacitly assumed
by most legal writers not of a particularly philosophic turn of mind.
'In his CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES (1930) xv. n. 3, Llewellyn expresses regret
that his book errs "in rarely reaching beyond business practice in the evaluation of legal
rules." His defense is that "time for building a wider foundation for judgment has been
lacking." This frankness is commendable, and one can only hope that it means that the man
who devotes more of his time to "evaluation" and less of it to the investigation of business
practice may look forward to being greeted by the realist as a valued co-worker whose
efforts supplement his own.
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At the other extreme is the view that "society" is the active principle
and that "law" is simply a function of this principle. This is the view
toward which Maine, Savigny, Ehrlich and Duguit tend. Llewellyn seems
to me to place himself in this class, though his closest affinity is with the last
two mentioned.
These are the extreme views. Each of them has a value,-as a corrective of the other. Indeed it is often difficult to say whether the emphasis
made by a given writer is intended to convey his conception of an ultimate
truth, or is intended simply to restore a balance which he considers to have
been disturbed by extremists on the other side. But fighting fire with fire is
always attended by hazards. We avoid the difficulties which arise from these
extreme simplistic positions if we recognize frankly that the relation is one
of mutual action and reaction. In the relation of law and society neither
element is wholly determinative, neither wholly determined. This intermediate view seems to me to represent the position of such scholars as Ihering, Pound, Geny, Stammler and Cohen.
In dealing with this problem we can employ with advantage Cohen's
principle of polarity. 9 Law and Society are polar categories. Though we
are under the necessity of opposing them to one another we must recognize
that each implies the other. If we deny one, the other becomes meaningless.
We may picture Law and Society as the two blades of a pair of scissors.
If we watch only one blade we may conclude it does all the cutting. Savigny
kept his eye on the Society blade and came virtually to deny the existence
of the Law blade. With him even the most technical lawyer's law was a
kind of glorified folk-way. 60 Austin kept his eye on the Law blade and
found little occasion in a book of over a thousand pages to discuss the mere
"positive morality" which social norms represent. Blackstone shifted his
eye from one blade to the other and gave us the confused account in which,
on the one hand, he bases the common law on custom, and, on the other,
informs us that the authoritative statement of this custom is to be found
only in court decisions. As if to add to the confusion, he then lays down
rules for determining when a custom should be recognized by the law.0 '
We avoid all these difficulties by the simple expedient of recognizing that
both blades cut, and that neither can cut without the other.
See COHEN, REASON AND NATUp (1931) 165 et seq.
Incidentally it is interesting to note that Savigny's problem here is much the same as
that which Llewellyn attempts to dispose of with his notion of the "pathological case".
Both start with the assumption that law ought to conform to folk-ways. Both are embarrassed by "technical lawyer's law". What shall we do with it? We not only have it,
we also obviously need it. Yet it threatens the theory. Savigny's solution of the dilemma
was to attempt a specious reconciliation of the fact with the theory. Llewellyn's solution is
to isolate the fact so that it may not contaminate the theory as a whole.
61I BL CoMM. *38-92. See Bentham's strictures, A COMmEN ON THE COMMENTARXES
(1928) 186 et seq.

'
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By saying that we avoid difficulties by adopting the "polar" view of
the relation of law and society, I do not mean to imply that the adoption
of this view renders the problem a simple one. On the contrary, the advantage of this view lies precisely in the fact that it reveals the difficulties which
exist and enables us to prepare to meet them. This view makes it clear that
the problem of the relation of law and society is not the sort of issue which
can be "solved" by some "theory" and then passed over. It is, to use Radin's
suggestive phrase, one of the "permanent problems of the law". But while
we may not have disposed of the question, we shall at least have divested it
of a specious simplicity which is itself the source of endless difficulty.
The "InstitutionalApproach" of Underhill Moore
What these difficulties are becomes apparent when an attempt is made
to apply in a practical way a simplistic conception of the relation of law and
society. One of the most recent and most thorough-going attempts to do
this is to be found in Underhill Moore's "institutional approach". Professor
Moore starts with the question, What actually controls judicial decisions?
The judge moves in a complex environment-moral, intellectual, and physical-and his decisions may be regarded as reactions to that environment.
But of the numberless factors of this environment, which are the most significant? The traditional theory supposed, or pretended to suppose, that the
judge was influenced solely by a segment of his intellectual environment, that
represented by "law" and legal theory. This view is no longer tenable. We
now realize that rules are impotent to exercise any real control over the
judicial process. Even when they seem to chart a definite course (which is
seldom because of their vagueness) frequent judicial aberrations from the
charted course remind us that there must be other, more significant factors
in the judge's environment. Professor Moore then sets about to discover
what these more significant factors are. One item after another is rejected.
Common sense rejects the assumption that the physical environment has any
very important, or at least measurable, influence over judicial decisions. A
poorly ventilated court room may conceivably affect the judicial process,but this is a remote and conjectural possibility. The notion that prevailing
philosophic notions, conceptions of the good life, may have any very great
influence is rejected because these things are matters of "intuition" and are
therefore incapable of scientific treatment. The search for some ultimately
determinative element begins to look futile. But let us not give up hope.
There is one constant in our shifting firmament. We still have the "institutional patterns of behavior" which prevail in the community. We know
that "men's actions move along the well-cut channels or straggling ruts of
habits,"-this is, indeed, "the conclusion of the philosopher, the psychologist
and the common man." These folk-ways, these institutional patterns of
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behavior, become then, like "the sun, the tides, the rain, one of the constant
factors among the welter of variables." Can we not assume that the judicial
process is controlled by them, that judicial decisions turn ultimately on the
institutional or non-institutional character of the litigants' behavior? 62
Professor Moore does not rest content with enunciating a theory; he
proceeds to test his theory in practice. Do the decisions actually reveal that
judges are primarily controlled by the patterns of behavior which prevail
in the community? To determine this three cases were selected for study.
All three related to the same point of banking law. Two cases (from New
York and Pennsylvania) decided the point in one way; -3 the other case
(from South Carolina) decided it in another way.64 Can we explain this
difference as arising, not from a different conception of "law", not from a
different philosophy of life or from other such imponderables, but from
an observable difference in the banking practices of South Carolina as compared with those of New York and Pennsylvania? An elaborate investigation was undertaken to answer this question.65
Now before undertaking such an investigation, one has to consider at
least four questions. How do you ascertain what social institutions exist,
or, to use Moore's own phrase, how do you go about "ethnologizing a particular present day culture"? How do you extract out of the social institutions so ascertained a norm of decision? Can you be sure that the courts will
be familiar with existing social institutions and will extract from them the
same norm of decision that you do? Can you be sure that the courts will
This paragraph is intended to summarize the arguments found in Rational Basis of
Legal Institutions (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rxv. 609, and An Institutional Approach to the Law of
Commercial Banking (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 703.
It may be objected at this point that Moore's study is not pertinent to the present inquiry
because he clearly disclaims any intent to say what law ought to be. He does not say how
courts ought to decide cases; he only describes how they must decide them. It would be
easy to answer this objection by pointing out that it is no unheard of thing for moralists to
present their Utopias as necessities, their "oughts" as "musts". But let us give Professor
Moore the benefit of the doubt and assume that he is not a preacher disguised as a scientist.
His study still remains pertinent to our discussion. Moore is at least disposing of other
people's "oughts" whether he is setting up one of his own or not. If courts must decide
cases by a reference to prevailing behavior patterns, then those who argue that they ought
to decide them on some other basis are wasting their breath. For this reason the ethical
philosopher cannot avoid bringing Moore into his discussions, however little Moore may feel
inclined to return the compliment.
'Delano v. Equitable Trust Co., iio Misc. 704, 181 N. Y. Supp. 852 (192o) ; Goldstein
v. Jefferson Title & Trust Co., 95 Pa. Super. 167 (1928).
" Callahan v. Bank of Anderson, 69 S. C. 374, 48 S. E. 293 (19o4).
' Moore and Sussman, supra note 14, a total of 145 pages. The method succeeded in explaining the South Carolina decision, and Moore therefore concludes that "the study probably justifies the inference of a causal relation" between judicial decisions and the institutional or deviational character of the litigants' behavior. Id. at 1249. Aside from the question whether the ability to explain a single decision is a very impressive demonstration of the
validity of a method, it is interesting to observe that the South Carolina case was decided by
an equally divided court. So while Moore succeeded in explaining why two of the judges
voted to affirm the decision of the lower court, he has yet to explain why the other two members of the court voted the other way.
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necessarily regard the norm of decision implied in a given social institution
as the best one? Moore's study involves an answer to each of these questions
and, it seems to me, in each case the answer which he gives is erroneous.
First of all, how do you go about determining what social institutions,
what folk-ways, exist? Professor Moore's answer is that you simply
observe the way people behave. If you are investigating banking practice
with reference to notes, you send an investigator into the cage of the note
teller to make a record of what he does. Or, you put a hypothetical situation
to an experienced banker and ask him how he would conduct himself in
such a case. The emphasis is on behavior. The purpose back of that behavior, the rationalizations and intellectual activity which accompany it are
ignored.
This, it seems to me, constitutes the fundamental fallacy of the "institutional approach" of Moore-the assumption that the significance of institutions is exhausted in behavior. In an early article he writes, "To say that
a legal institution,-private property, the federal government of the United
States, Columbia University,--exists is to say that a group of persons is doing something, is acting in some way." 66 Now many people would say that
a legal institution consists not of actions, but of attitudes of mind to which
actions merely give external expression. This view is rejected by Moore on
the ground, I take it, that these attitudes of mind are usually simply rationalizations of the behavior which they accompany, and are therefore the effect
of the behavior, not the cause of it. Now it is quite true that this is often
the case. But the truth here happens to be complex, and it is also true that
behavior is, at least sometimes, the expression of mental attitudes. This fact
is enough to vitiate any purely "behavioristic" approach to social institutions.
Bankers were never asked by Professor Moore's investigators what
they were trying to accomplish, or why they acted as they did. They were
only "observed", or were asked to state how they would react to certain situations selected by Professor Moore and phrased in his own language. The
fallacy of this procedure becomes apparent when we realize that it is impossible to define what the "situation" is to which the banker reacts unless we
know what is going on in his mind. We observe that a banker, whose
customer's note is due and unpaid, refrains from charging the amount of the
note against the customer's checking account until the consent of the customer has been obtained. What is the situation which called forth this reaction? Moore defines the situation entirely in terms of "observables". Was
the note secured? How did the note come into the hands of the bank? Had
the note just come due, or had it been overdue for some time? Yet from the
standpoint of the banker, these were perhaps the least significant elements
in the situation. The most significant factor from the standpoint of the
, Moore, supra note 62, at 6og.
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banker may have been the fact that the customer's default on the note was
obviously due to an oversight, or the fact that the customer was a man of
good credit standing, or some other fact not stated in Moore's hypothetical
"situation".
The realists regard as one of the fundamental fallacies of the traditional
method its assumption that the judge reacts only to those facts of the case
which are visible through the prism of legal theory. In truth, the judge's
decision represents a reaction to the whole situation, including many facts
which from the standpoint of legal theory are irrelevant. The realist condemns the traditional method for its mistaken assumption that you can
limit the influence of facts to those tagged as legally relevant, and for the
corollary assumption that it is profitable to discuss the solution of controversies on the basis of textbook outlines of the facts. Yet precisely the same
fallacy, if it is a fallacy, is contained in Moore's approach. He adopts toward
bankers the same attitude the traditional theory adopts toward judges,-a
procedure which could only be justified on the doubtful assumption that
bankers possess less complicated personalities than judges. He assumes that
there are principles guiding the practice of banking which one can discover
merely by asking a banker how he would react in certain skeletonized "situations". 6 ' He seems aware of the temerity of this procedure and of the
need for justifying it for he is at pains to report that the answers which
bankers gave to his questions were "stated with the positive assurance with
which are given descriptions of the way everyday situations are met." 68
This may seem to prove that he had accurately stated the "situations" to
which bankers react, but I think that this inference is wholly without justification. If some earnest sociologist were to attempt a "scientific" investigation into the folk-ways of lawyers, and were to ask one hundred unselected
lawyers, "Can a man who has rescinded a contract, sue on it?" I suspect
that most of his answers would be in the negative and would be given with
"positive assurance". The "positive assurance" would exist precisely because the lawyer was asked about a skeletonized, "conceptual" situation. If
he were put a series of actual cases his assurance would probably diminish
to the vanishing point. Professor Moore asked his bankers if, when a customer's note was due, they charged the note against his account without authority from him. They gave, for the most part, ready answers. Would the
answers have been so ready if the situation had been filled out with such
' For the purpose of making clear my own attitude, I should say that I do not share unqualifiedly the realist's antipathy toward skeletonized cases. I think such cases have both a
dialectic and a pedagogical utility. But the "skeletonizing" of cases is a delicate business, and
necessarily anticipates the analysis which will be applied to the simplified situation. This
means that when you "skeletonize" situations for bankers you have to do so with reference to
the principles on which bankers act in the conduct of their business. This is what Moore

made no attempt to do.
' Moore and Sussman, supra note 14, at 759.
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pertinent facts as the credit standing of the customer, the availability or nonavailability of legal advice inside the bank, the apparent reason for the customer's default (oversight, insolvency, temporary stringency, etc.) and the
purpose for which the account was being used? And if not, does the uniformity of the banker's reactions to skeletonized fact situations represent a
really significant "institution"?
An uncritical adherence to the behavioristic approach leads to another
erroneous assumption, that norms of decision may be extracted directly
from regularities of behavior, and that where you have a definite "behavior
pattern" you necessarily have a correspondingly definite norm of decision.
Now this is demonstrably untrue. It may be the practice of department
stores generally to accept goods returned by customers. This behavior pattern may be exemplified in literally thousands of instances. But what norm
of decision is implied in this practice? The department store, we shall
assume, refuses to accept goods returned by the customer and the customer
sues. Now we cannot decide this case simply by referring to the existence
of a pattern of behavior. The mere fact that people habitually act in certain
ways in certain situations is not itself a criterion on the basis of which lawsuits may be decided. If a folk-way is relevant to decision, it must be because
it has a "normative" aspect.6 9 But we cannot discover this normative aspect
wMoore does not attempt to extract a norm of decision directly out of the behavior patterns which his investigation uncovered. This would have been impossible in view of the
behavioristic method pursued in charting these patterns. Nevertheless it is obvious that
sooner or later it will be necessary to bridge the gap between plain, brute fact and sentiments
and attitudes which alone can serve as a basis for judicial decision. It is interesting to-note
how and where Moore makes this transition. His investigation disclosed that the behavior
involved in all three cases was "non-institutional"-a result which he had anticipated. Yet
obviously this cannot explain why one case was decided in one way and the other two cases
in another. This disparity is to be explained by the fact that there was a difference in the
degree in which the behavior involved deviated from the nearest imstitntional pattert. Id.
at 1219. Now two questions arise. What is the nearest institutional pattern? One might
have expected that Professor Moore would begin at this point to treat his bank tellers as
something other than automata, and he might inquire what patterns they would be most likely
to regard as offering a precedent for their behavior. But no, our bank tellers remain mere
habit complexes, and the "nearest institutional pattern" is determined without any reference
to their possible mental processes by a mechanical procedure akin to matching samples of
cloth. We are now ready to measure the degree of deviation. One might suppose that the
same "objective", mathematical method would have been preserved in dealing with this problem. But instead we find that Professor Moore has suddenly endowed his bank tellers with
brains, and they are now assumed to act purposively and intelligently. We measure the "degree of deviation" by asking such questions as whether the actual conduct of the parties was
as efficient a device for doing business as the institutional pattern, whether it was such a
deviation as would be likely to arouse resentment on account of its unfairness-in short, by
asking whether the departure was "reasonable" under the circumstances. In the end, then,
Moore's method turns out to involve the same intangible'elements which are involved in the
more conventional approach. The only difference is that in determining "reasonableness"
under his method you are forced to take as your standard of comparison what the charts reveal as the nearest institutional pattern of behavior. But after all this limitation is more
apparent than real, since the basis on which comparison is made remains vague enough to
afford sufficient leeway for the active legal imagination.
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by a mere statistical investigation, by inquiring, in the case I have supposed,
how many times department stores have accepted returned goods. We have
to discover whether this practice is merely a matter of accommodation ("the
customer is always right"), or has established an attitude of expectancy, a
sentiment of "ought", which can serve as a norm of decision. The interesting thing is that we can get the most light on this normative aspect of the
practice from the way in which the department store acts in what Professor
Moore calls "deviational" cases, for example, where the customer's dissatisfaction with the goods is patently unreasonable. The essence of an "institution" will generally be found, not in "behavior", but in mental attitudes,
and frequently the nature of these attitudes is revealed and defined only in
"won-institutouzl" situations. Often it is the observation of behavior in the
unusual case which gives definiteness to the contour of an institution.
So soon as we abandon the attempt to stick to a purely behavioristic
approach, and begin to take into account the intellectual processes which
accompany and guide behavior, we see at once the absurdity of the view that
the law should (or does) simply take over social institutions as a ready-made
norm of decision. We see that our note teller's patterns of behavior may be
shaped, not by an invisible psychological force which confines him to some
"straggling rut of habit", but by his own imperfect notions of the law, so
that to take over his patterns of behavior as a norm of decision is simply to
put the judicial ermine on the bank teller and to substitute second-hand
knowledge and rumor for the researches of judge and counsel. We see also
that "law" and "institutional patterns of behavior" often derive from a
common emotional and intellectual source-for example, from current conFor assistance in
ceptions of business expediency and social justice.
Moore's method requires us to answer three questions: (i) what institutional patterns of
behavior exist? (2) which of the institutional patterns does the actual behavior of the parties most nearly resemble? (3) how much does the actual conduct of the parties deviate
from this pattern? Moore attempts to answer the first two questions on a purely behavioristic basis. In answering the third question the behavioristic approach is abandoned. Moore's
study does not, then achieve "objectivity" through the total elimination of "rational" and "intuitive" elements. All it achieves is a postponement of these elements. What is accomplished
by that postponement remains unexplained.
Professor Moore has performed a valuable service in calling attention to the need for
an actual investigation of lay practices where they are relevant to judicial decision. Courts
too often glibly and erroneously assume that they know what these practices are. But Moore's
method, as I see it, is fatally defective in its assumption that these practices can, profitably be
divorced from their "rational" background.
' The South Carolina deviation from the rule obtaining in Pennsylvania and New York
might conceivably have been explained on the basis of Southern business nwres. My own
experience in the South would lead me to believe that the Southerner does not typically regard the debtor-creditor relationship in the impersonal, "business-like" way it is regarded in
the North. It is a personal relation, involving a duty of consideration not only of debtor
toward creditor, but of creditor toward debtor. This makes it understandable why a Southern
judge would feel a resentment toward a banker who suddenly began turning down his customer's checks, after allowing his note to remain overdue without action for a considerable
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understanding these intangibles we shall be forced to call back the "brilliant
intuitionalists" whom Professor Moore so cavalierly dismissed at the beginning of his study.
Professor Moore claims for his method that it corresponds to the method
actually employed by courts, whether they are aware of that fact or not.
This necessarily assumes that courts are familiar with the behavior patterns
of the community. For the culture patterns of life inside the bank teller's
cage can influence the judge only if he knows of them. Yet there seems a
certain temerity in the assumption that the justices of the Supreme Court
of South Carolina (whose biographies incidentally reveal no practical banking experience 71) already knew what Moore's investigators took months to
learn. Moore meets this point only by saying that the judge's "attitudes and
ideas are molded by a cultural matrix whose patterns are engraved by frequency. Put in another way, if the court [the judge?] is not conditioned
by frequent contact with the behavior itself, it is conditioned by verbal behavior which will be found, on last analysis, to be causally related to the
patterns or institutions." 72 I am not quite sure that I understand this. It
seems to mean that the judge in the contacts of daily life will inevitably hear
turns of expression which, in some subtle way, will convey to him an insight
into what note tellers are doing about debiting direct discounts. But it is
hard to believe Professor Moore meant anything quite so preposterous as
that. In view of the uncertainty of his meaning, perhaps it would be best to
let this point go without refutation.
Let us, then, grant Professor Moore his point about the "cultural
matrix", even if we remain a little obscure as to what it is we are granting.
Let us assume that there exists a definite pattern of behavior, that the court
knows of it, and that the court has been able to extract from it a norm of
decision. Still it by no means follows, as Moore seems to assume, that the
court will or should regard the norm so obtained as the most desirable basis
of decision. Obviously where a court disapproves the end toward which a
social practice is directed, it may refuse to accept the practice as a norm of
decision. A court may decline to enforce a gambling debt, though it be
period. Professor Moore would, of course, scoff at any such explanation as resting on "intuition". But is any more "intuition" involved in this explanation than is involved in his assumption that, in some mysterious way, judges know or "sense" the institutional patterns of
behavior prevailing in their communities? But then this assumption probably represents an
example of the "qualitative subjective judgment" which Moore admits is involved in his
method; it cannot be mere "intuition" for that is presumably excluded from his approach.
I' See BRooxs, SOUTH CAROLiNA BEcCH AND BAR (19o8) for biographical sketches of
the four justices involved. Incidentally there is nothing in the biographies of the two dissenting judges which would explain why the cultural matrix failed to make an impress on
them.
- Moore and Sussman, supra note 14, at 1219.
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admitted that the norms of society call for the payment of such debts. Courts
exercise at least a veto power over folk-ways. This qualification of the
"institutional method" is so obvious that we would be unfair if we did not
assume that the proponents of the method had it tacitly in mind. Let us turn
to a less obvious point. Does the institutional method remain valid in those
situations where the court regards as innocent the purpose which the parties
are attempting to achieve? I think not. To accept the "institutional approach" uncritically even in these cases is to overlook the fact that a court
may refuse to conform to a folk-way, not because it disapproves of the object
toward which it is directed, but because it considers it ill-adapted to achieve
that object. It is to ignore the possibility that a court may undertake to
reshape a "behavior pattern" to assist it in reaching its own end. If it were
true, for example, that laymen generally regarded the ceremony of "shaking
on it" as creating a binding contract, it would not follow that a court would
have to accept this ceremony as a valid legal formality if it considered that
it offered insufficient safeguards against the dangers which legal formalities
are supposed to avert.73 The law has always to weigh against the advantages of conforming to life, the advantages of reshaping and clarifying life,
bearing always in mind that its attempts to reshape life may miscarry, or
74
may cost mote than they achieve.

Llewellyn does not, I think, carry the behavioristic view as far as it is
carried by Moore. He recognizes a qualffication on the "institutional approach" which Moore apparently does not-that in many cases law, instead
of merely conforming to folk-ways, actually shapes and controls then.
Nevertheless he is not, I think, entirely free from the erroneous assumptions
found in Moore's study. I have already expressed the view that he is guilty
of at least an error in emphasis. Furthermore there seems to run through
his writings the assumption that "law" is only a kind of surrogate for missing
folk-ways. In terms of the figure of the scissors, the Law blade only comes
into operation when for some reason the Society blade is unable to cut by
itself. Indeed, the situation where "the normal ways of society afford . . .
no solid basis" of decision and where, accordingly, we must resort to the
' Our courts probably made a mistake in following lay practice in the "liberalization" of
the requirement of a seal. In this way they frittered away, perhaps irretrievably, a valuable
social practice.
' Ihering speaks of the close relation which existed between law and business in ancient
Rome. He goes on to say, "The intimacy of the relation between legal science and business
redounded to the benefit of both. To the benefit of business, because the lawyer had his hand
constantly on its pulse and knew what it needed and how it could be helped. To the benefit
of jurisprudence because, without denying in any material respect the demands of business, it
could bring business into that .form which was, from the legal standpoint, the most desirable
one." IH.iRNG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 418. American "institutionalists" should, I think,
ponder the last sentence, to see whether it may not describe a desideratum they have fallen
into the habit of overlooking.
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"law" for solution is quite frankly labelled "pathological". 75 This, it seems
to me, clearly implies a behavioristic ethics.
The Emotional Foundations of Realism
The positivistic and behavioristic ethical philosophy of Llewellyn and
Moore is found in other realists. In fact it may be said to constitute a strong
undercurrent of the realist movement as a whole. Duguit's "positivism",
which is another kind of realism, has led him to a similar position. Why
should this be? Why should realism, which starts out as a reform movement, carry in its loins this essentially reactionary principle? I think the
paradox is explainable.
It is well to remember that the difference between the realist and the
"conceptualist" is not so much a matter of specific beliefs as it is of mental
constitutions. The conceptualist is not naive enough to suppose that his
principles always realize themselves in practice. Indeed, since he is usually
a practical man, he is apt to be more familiar with the specific ways in which
life fails to conform to the rules imposed on it than the more philosophic
realist. It is not, then, that the conceptualist is ignorant of the discrepancy
between Is and Ought. He is simply undisturbed by it.
On the other hand, the cleft between Is and Ought causes acute distress to the realist. He sets about resolutely to eliminate it. There are two
ways in which this may be done. The Is may be compelled to conform to
the Ought, or the Ought may be permitted to acquiesce in the Is. There
are enormous difficulties in the first course. Life resists our attempts to
subject it to rules; the muddy flow of Being sweeps contemptuously over
the barriers ot our Ought. There is something even more disheartening. We
find it impossible to say exactly what it is we wish life to conform to, what
our Ought is. Life laughs at our rules, and even our rules betray us by
refusing to reveal their nature to us. The easier course beckons temptingly,
to let the Ought acquiesce in the Is, to let law surrender to life.
The realist ends in ambiguity. About one thing he is dear. The disgraceful discrepancy between life and rules must be eliminated. But he is
not sure whether his prescription is to force life into conformity with a new,
more carefully drawn set of rules, or to permit rules to give way to life.
This ambiguity is found in what is perhaps the most ancient formulation of
legal realism: Regula est, quae rem quae est breviter enarrat. Non ex
LLEwELLvY N, loc. cit. supra note 56. The attitude of Moore and Llewellyn toward the
problem of the relation of law and society may perhaps reveal the distortion which comes
from viewing the law from the perspective of one specialty; in their case, commercial law.

It is doubtful whether it would occur to a specialist in torts or criminal law to urge a greater
conformity of law to folk-ways, though such a person would probably go along with Moore
and Llewellyn in urging the relevance of folk-ways in those fields.
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regula ius suinatur, sed ex jure quod est regula fiat. 0 Don't get your law
from rules, bur get your rules from the law that is. Is this merely a methodological caution, warning us that paper rules often fail to express adequately
the principles actually in force? Or does it mean that principles really have
no force, and we must get our rules from the "law" of life itself? The
clarity of the realist position has not increased perceptibly since the time of
Paulus. The modern realist is still not clear in his own mind whether he
objects to "conceptualism" because it fails to achieve an accurate formulation of its principles, or because it pretends to proceed according to principle
at all.
Paulus in

DIG. 50, 17,

De diversis regulis, I.

